Home »

Middle East News on Dec. 9th, 2018

December 09, 2018

VietPress USA : News source: www.reddit.com
2
Posted by
u/assousa
1 day ago

Shifting Middle Eastern sands spotlight diverging US-Saudi interests
By James M. Dorsey
A series of Gulf and Middle East-related developments suggest that resolving some of the Middle East’s most debilitating and devastating crises while ensuring that efforts to pressure Iran do not perpetuate the mayhem may be easier said than done. They also suggest that the same is true for keeping US and Saudi interests aligned.
Optimists garner hope from the fact that the US Senate may censor Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman for the October 2 killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul; the positive start of Yemeni peace talks in Sweden with an agreement to exchange prisoners, Saudi Arabia’s invitation to Qatar to attend an October 9 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit in Riyadh, and a decision by the Organization of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC) to cut production.
That optimism, however, may not be borne out by facts on the ground and analysis of developments that are likely to produce at best motion rather than movement. In fact, more fundamentally, what many of the developments suggest is an unacknowledged progressive shift in the region’s alliances stemming in part from the fact that the bandwidth of shared US-Saudi interests is narrowing.
There is no indication that, even if Qatari emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani decides to accept an invitation by Saudi king Salman to attend the GCC summit rather than send a lower level delegation or not attend at all, either the kingdom or the United Arab Emirates, the main drivers behind the 17-month old economic and diplomatic boycott of the Gulf state, are open to a face-saving solution despite US pressure to end to the rift.
Signalling that the invitation and an earlier comment by Prince Mohammed that “despite the differences we have, (Qatar) has a great economy and will be doing a lot in the next five years” do not indicate a potential policy shift, UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Anwar Gargash insisted that the GCC remained strong despite the rift. “The political crisis will end when the cause behind it ends and that is Qatar’s support of extremism and its interference in the stability of the region.,” Mr. Gargash said, reiterating long-standing Saudi-UAE allegations.
Similarly, United Nations-sponsored peace talks in Sweden convened with the help of the United States may at best result in alleviating the suffering of millions as a result of the almost four-year old Saudi-UAE military intervention in Yemen but are unlikely to ensure that a stable resolution of the conflict is achievable without a lowering of tension between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Even humanitarian relief remains in question with the parties in Sweden unable to agree on a reopening of Sana’a airport to facilitate the flow of aid.
More realistically, with the Trump administration, backed by Saudi Arabia and Israel, determined to cripple Iran economically in a bid to force it to alter its regional policies, if not change the regime in Tehran, chances are the Yemeni conflict will be perpetuated rather than resolved.
To Yemen’s detriment, Iran is emerging as one of the foremost remaining shared US-Saudi interests as the two countries struggle to manage their relationship in the wake of Mr. Khashoggi’s killing. That struggle is evident with the kingdom’s Washington backers divided between erstwhile backers-turned-vehement critics like Republican senator Graham Lindsey and hardline supporters such as national security advisor John Bolton. The jury is out on who will emerge on top in the Washington debate.
The risks of the Saud-Iranian rivalry spinning out of control possibly with the support of hardliners like Mr. Bolton were evident in this week’s suicide bombing in the Iranian port of Chabahar, an Indian-backed project granted a waiver from US sanctions against the Islamic republic to counter influence of China that support the nearby Pakistani port of Gwadar.
Iranian officials, including Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and Revolutionary Guards spokesman Brigadier General Ramadan Sharif suggested without providing evidence that Saudi Arabia was complicit in the attack that targeted the city’s police headquarters, killing two people and wounding 40 others.
Iran’s semi-official Tasnim news agency, believed to be close to the Guards, said the attack was the work of Ansar al-Furqan, an Iranian Sunni jihadi group that Iran claims enjoys Saudi backing.
Iran’s allegation of Saudi complicity is partly grounded in the fact that a Saudi thinktank linked to Prince Mohammed last year advocated fuelling an insurgency in the Iranian province of Sistan and Baluchistan that incudes Chabahar in a bid to thwart the port development while Mr. Bolton before becoming US President Donald J. Trump’s advisor called for US support of ethnic minorities in Iran.
In a bid to create building blocks for the fuelling of ethnic insurgencies in Iran, Pakistani militants have said that Saudi Arabia had in recent years poured money into militant anti-Iranian, anti-Shiite madrassas or religious seminaries in the Pakistani province of Balochistan that borders on Sistan and Baluchistan.
The divergence of US-Saudi interests, agreement on Iran notwithstanding, was on display in this week’s defeat of a US effort to get the UN General Assembly to condemn Hamas, the Islamist group that controls the Gaza Strip. Saudi Arabia, despite the kingdom’s denunciation of Hamas as a terrorist organization and its demand that Qatar halt support of it, voted against the resolution.
The vote suggested that Mr. Trump may be hoping in vain for Saudi backing of his as yet undisclosed plan to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute that is believed to be slanted towards Israel’s position.
Saudi ambassador to the UN Abdallah Al-Mouallimi said the defeated UN resolution would “undermine the two-state solution which we aspire to” and divert attention from Israel’s occupation, settlement activities and “blockade” of territories occupied during the 1967 Middle East war.
Saudi Arabia’s changing status and the divergence of longer-term US-Saudi interests was also evident in this week’s OPEC meeting in Vienna.
To get an OPEC deal on production levels, the kingdom, once the oil market’s dominant swing producer, needed an agreement with non-OPEC member Russia on production levels as well as Russian assistance in managing Iranian resistance, suggesting
The agreement, moreover, had to balance Mr. Trump’s frequently tweeted demand for lower prices, and the kingdom’s need for higher ones to fund its budgetary requirements and Prince Mohammed’s ambitious economic reforms and demonstrate that the Khashoggi affair had not made it more vulnerable to US pressure.
The emerging divergence of US-Saudi interests in part reflects a wider debate within America's foreign policy community about what values the United States and US diplomats should be promoting.
With some of Mr. Trump's ambassadorial political appointees expressing support for populist, nationalist and authoritarian leaders and political groups, the fact that some of the president's closest Congressional allies back the anti-Saudi resolution illustrates that there are red lines that a significant number of the president’s supporters are not willing to cross.
All told, recent developments in the Middle East put a spotlight on the changing nature of a key US relationship in the Middle East that could have far-reaching consequences over the middle and long-term. It is a change that is part of a larger, global shift in US priorities and alliances that is likely to outlive Mr. Trump’s term(s) in office.
Dr. James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, co-director of the University of Würzburg’s Institute for Fan Culture, and co-host of the New Books in Middle Eastern Studies podcast. James is the author of The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer blog, a book with the same title and a co-authored volume, Comparative Political Transitions between Southeast Asia and the Middle East and North Africa as well as Shifting Sands, Essays on Sports and Politics in the Middle East and North Africa and just published China and the Middle East: Venturing into the Maelstrom
Comment
5
Posted by
u/assousa
3 days ago

US Senate resolution potentially changes Middle East dynamics
By James M. Dorsey
A draft US Senate resolution describing Saudi policy in the Middle East as a "wrecking ball" and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman as “complicit” in the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, if adopted and implemented, potentially could change the dynamics of the region's politics and create an initial exit from almost a decade of mayhem, conflict and bloodshed.
The six-page draft also holds Prince Mohammed accountable for the devastating war in Yemen that has sparked one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, the failure to end the 17-month-old Saudi-United Arab Emirates-led economic and diplomatic boycott of Qatar, and the jailing and torture of Saudi dissidents and activists.
In doing so, the resolution confronts not only Prince Mohammed's policies but also by implication those of his closest ally, UAE crown prince Mohammed bin Zayed. The UAE was the first country that Saudi leader visited after the Khashoggi killing.
By in effect challenging the position of king-in-waiting Prince Mohammed, the resolution raises the question whether some of his closest allies, including the UAE crown prince, will in future want to be identified that closely with him.
Moreover, by demanding the release of activist Raif bin Muhammad Badawi, better known as Raif Badawi, and women's rights activists, the resolution further the challenges fundamentals of Prince Mohammed's iron-fisted repression of his critics, the extent of his proposed social reforms as part of his drive to diversify and streamline the Saudi economy, and the kingdom's human rights record.
A 34-year-old blogger who named his website Free Saudi Liberals, Mr. Badawi was barred from travel and had his assets frozen in 2009, arrested in 2012, and sentenced to 10 years in prison and 1,000 lashes for insulting Islam. His sister, Samar Badawi, a women’s rights activist, was detained earlier this year. Mr. Badawi’s wife and children were granted asylum and citizenship in Canada.
A diplomatic row that stunned many erupted in August when Saudi Arabia expelled the Canadian ambassador after the foreign ministry in Ottawa demanded in a tweet the release of Ms. Badawi and other activists.
Prince Mohammed and Saudi Arabia, even prior to introduction of the Senate resolution, were discovering that the Khashoggi killing had weakened the kingdom internationally and had made it more vulnerable to pressure.
Talks in Sweden between the Saudi-backed Yemeni government and Houthi rebels to end the war is the most immediate consequence of the kingdom's changing position.
So is the resolution that is unprecedented in the scope and harshness of the criticism of a long-standing ally.
While the resolution is likely to spark initial anger among some of Prince's Mohammed's allies, it nevertheless, if adopted and/or implemented, could persuade some like UAE crown prince Mohammed to rethink their fundamental strategies.
The relationship between the two Mohammeds constituted a cornerstone of the UAE leader's strategy to achieve his political, foreign policy and defense goals.
These include projecting the Emirates as a guiding light of cutting-edge Arab and Muslim modernity; ensuring that the Middle East fits the crown prince's autocratic, anti-Islamist mould; and enabling the UAE, described by US defense secretary Jim Mattis as 'Little Sparta,' to punch above its weight politically, diplomatically and militarily.
To compensate for the Emirates’ small size, Prince Mohammed opted to pursue his goals in part by working through the Saudi royal court. In leaked emails, UAE ambassador to Washington Yousef al-Otaiba, a close associate of Prince Mohammed, said of the Saudi crown prince that “I don’t think we’ll ever see a more pragmatic leader in that country.”
Mr. Al-Otaiba went on to say: “I think in the long term we might be a good influence on KSA (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia), at least with certain people there. Our relationship with them is based on strategic depth, shared interests, and most importantly the hope that we could influence them. Not the other way around.”
The impact of the Senate resolution and what it means for the US policy will to a large extent depend on the politics of the differences between the Congress and President Donald J. Trump who has so far sought to shield the Saudi crown prince.
To further do so, Mr. Trump, with or without the resolution, would likely have to pressure Saudi Arabia to give him something tangible to work with such as an immediate release of imprisoned activists followed by a resolution of the Qatar crisis as well as some indication that the Yemen peace negotiations are progressing.
Whichever way, the fallout of the Khashoggi killing, culminating in unprecedented Congressional anger against Prince Mohammed and the kingdom, is likely to have significant consequences not only for the Saudi crown prince but potentially also for the strategy of his UAE counterpart.
That in turn could create light at the end of the Middle East's tunnel of almost a decade of volatility and violent and bloody conflict that has been driven by Saudi and UAE assertiveness in countering dissent at home and abroad in the wake of the 2011 popular Arab revolts as well as Iran that has played its part in countries like Syria and Yemen in fuelling destruction and bloodshed.
Dr. James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, co-director of the University of Würzburg’s Institute for Fan Culture, and co-host of the New Books in Middle Eastern Studies podcast. James is the author of The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer blog, a book with the same title and a co-authored volume, Comparative Political Transitions between Southeast Asia and the Middle East and North Africa as well as Shifting Sands, Essays on Sports and Politics in the Middle East and North Africa and just published China and the Middle East: Venturing into the Maelstrom
1 Comment
1
Posted by
u/Dr_Jorge
5 days ago

The Persian Gulf
We re-introduced the EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY yesterday. Today we will present some key elements related to the Persian Gulf.
From our previous posts, we have learnt so far that some of the main concerns related to the Persian Gulf are:
Borders
This could be a matter of controversy. In the particular case of territorial sea, although it may seem that borders are not an issue—as the difference has to do with several islands—the exclusive economic zone often creates tension between many of the claiming parties. 
For instance, who has the right to explore that exclusive sea-zone? What happens in the zone in which two or more claiming parties overlap? As this point is intrinsically linked to natural resources, it will be examined after introducing the latter.
Defense
National defense will be seen here as the protection of any interest a state has—e.g. possessions, territory, and population—through different means—e.g. military, economic, and diplomatic. 
There are several states in which the army and navy are not big, well equipped or trained enough in order to defend their territory or population but they are still respected as states. There are others that in fact do not have military defense at all, their defense being the responsibility of another country or an international organization—e.g. OTAN.
There seems to be no problem with defense. The territory being defended is obviously desirable although the task is one which can be shared. However, what would happen if another party—i.e. a sovereign state with no part in the conflict—decided to invade the third territory? In the hypothetical scenario an external party to the region decided to invade the Persian Gulf, who would defend the area? 
The ways in which the situation may develop are as follows:
a) The regional neighbor countries may remain neutral; consequently, the external agent would take over the area if the inhabitants were unable to defend themselves (or in the case of uninhabited islands or the sea);
b) one of the sovereign states may respond to the invasion and defend the third territory;
c) all sovereign states may respond to the invasion and defend jointly or independently the area.
Natural resources
Natural resources are any material in raw condition present in the territory, organic or mineral, that is not initially a product of any kind of human activity. Some states are rich in natural resources, others are not: no particular amount of natural resources defines a state. 
But, the distribution of natural resources is usually one of the main problems when dealing with sovereignty disputes even though the involved sovereign States may already be wealthy ones; it is a feature that always presents controversy.
In the case of the Persian Gulf and oil, any decision over this point has particular importance since it could affect the future the legal and political balance in the region.
Next time both are combined (the EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY and the elements detailed before) to offer a potential ideal solution.
NOTE: based on Chapter 7, Núñez, Jorge Emilio. 2017. Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue. London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group.
Dr Jorge E. Núñez Email: j.nunez@mmu.ac.uk Twitter: London1701 Blog: https://london1701.blogspot.com Instagram: griseldacurti Facebook: Griselda Curti Tumblr: drjorgesblog
Comment
1
Posted by
u/assousa
7 days ago

ROYAL ROAD AHEAD: SAUDI PRINCE LEAVES G20 CONFIDENT, TURNING CORNER AFTER KHASHOGGI SCANDAL
• World appears to be moving forward following shocking murder of journalist and Mohammed bin Salman appears happy to join them BY JAMES M. DORSEY 2 DEC 2018 0 SHARE • 2Comments • • Part of the ‘family photo’ featuring world leaders including Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed bin Salman at the G20 summit in Buenos Aires, Argentina, on November 30, 2018. Photo: EPA THERE WAS A high-five from Vladimir Putin. And for Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi it was business as usual. At home, Saudi Arabia’s media trumpeted Mohammed bin Salman’s meetings with world leaders, tweeting pictures of his encounters, which also included the presidents of South Korea, Mexico, and South Africa. However, Western leaders appeared to avoid the crown prince during the family photo at the Group of 20 summit in Buenos Aires – after almost two months of global outrage at the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. The only Arab leader there, the prince stood rather isolated at the end of the line, at times looking uncertain and nervous. Mohammed waiting for the family photo at the G20 summit in Buenos Aires on November 30, 2018. Photo: Reuters US President Donald Trump, Prince Mohammed’s most vocal backer, did not have time for a one-on-one meeting. Argentina’s President Mauricio Macri kept the prince hanging on when it came to finding time to talk. During an informal conversation on the sidelines of the summit, French President Emmanuel Macron was overheard admonishing Mohammed, saying he “never listened”, while the crown prince tried to assure him that “it’s OK”. French officials later said the men were discussing the killing of Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul and the war in Yemen. Prince Mohammed chatting with French President Emmanuel Macron in Buenos Aires. Photo: Bandar al-Jaloud/Saudi Royal Palace/AFP Similarly, British Prime Minister Theresa May opted to focus on those two topics, rather than economics and trade as her country struggles with the uncertainty of Brexit, the UK’s departure from the European Union. May insisted Riyadh needed “to build confidence that such a deplorable incident could not happen again”, referring to the Saudi team sent to Turkey to murder Khashoggi. The message Prince Mohammed probably took home from the G20 summit was that illiberal democratic, authoritarian and autocratic leaders were happy to do business with the kingdom and the crown prince despite persistent assertions that he ordered the killing. British Prime Minister Theresa May and Prince Mohammad during their meeting in Buenos Aires. Photo: EPA Trump and western Europe’s leaders appeared to play to public opinion but do nothing to threaten their relations with the kingdom. The US president also chose not to have a formal meeting with Prince Mohammed’s foremost detractor, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The crown prince may also have been heartened that Prime Minister Justin Trudeau of Canada, which Saudi Arabia had a diplomatic row with earlier this year, was the only leader to raise the Khashoggi issue during the G20’s formal proceedings. Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau during a plenary session at the G20 Summit on December 1, 2018. Photo: EPA Other US allies made clear the kingdom’s financial largesse and willingness to guarantee the flow of oil would go a long way to ensure they would choose realism above principle. The Saudi Press Agency reported after Mohammed’s meeting with Modi that the crown prince pledged to meet India’s oil and petroleum product needs. Prince Mohammed may have achieved his goal of showing Saudi Arabia – specifically himself – remained a player by attending the G20 summit, despite the storm surrounding Khashoggi’s death still raging. But the prince is not out of the woods yet. The kingdom, eager to project itself as a regional and world power, has suffered significant damage to its reputation which will take time and hard work to repair. Just how hard depends on whether the US Congress decides to sanction Riyadh, if the Europeans will follow suit, and on Turkey successfully pushing for an international investigation into the killing. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan walking past Prince Mohammed before the G20 summit family photo. Photo: Reuters “We have never seen Khashoggi’s murder as a political issue,” Erdogan told a news conference in Buenos Aires. “For Turkey, the incident is and will remain a flagrant murder within the Islamic world. International public opinion will not be satisfied until all those responsible for his death are revealed.” He described Saudi Arabia’s response to the killing as “unbelievable”. The US Senate, meanwhile, pushed forward last week – despite opposition from Trump – with a resolution that would end American military support for the Saudi-led war in Yemen, a conflict which has cause a major humanitarian crisis. Yemenis queuing up to get their daily bread rations from a food aid distribution centre in Sanaa, Yemen, on November 28, 2018. Photo: Xinhua Prince Mohammed’s case was not helped by the leak of a CIA report saying he sent 11 messages to Saud al-Qahtani – a former close aide – at the time Khashoggi was killed. However, the intelligence agency admitted it lacked direct evidence of the crown prince “issuing a kill order”. Qahtani has been accused of overseeing the killing and been fired from his position as Mohammed’s adviser and information tsar. He has also been sanctioned by Washington. The CIA claims Prince Mohammed told associates in August 2017 they “could possibly lure [Khashoggi] outside Saudi Arabia and make arrangements” if the Washington Post columnist refused to return to the kingdom from the US. Mohammed with President Xi Jinping. Photo: Xinhua/AP Nevertheless, the G20 summit suggests Prince Mohammed and the kingdom may have taken their first step towards putting the Khashoggi affair behind them. Even if US lawmakers slap sanctions on the kingdom, the prince is likely to remain secure in his position as king-in-waiting. Keeping Khashoggi in the headlines will prove increasingly difficult as it seems much of the world has signalled that it is moving on.
James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Comment

Related Post: